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Introduction  
The success of the Sardinian ISP Tiscali, at the turn of the new millennium, was 
a new and critical event for Cagliari, the main town on the island of Sardinia, a 
region known for its beautiful landscape and slow pace of life rather than its 
economic fortunes. The local economy had suddenly gained a reputation for 
innovation and industrial success in the new field of information and 
communications technology.  Was Tiscali an isolated episode? Or was it a 
symptom of a wider change in the industrial fabric of Cagliari and Sardinia?  
This paper provides a broad description of the local infrastructure and economy 
in the Cagliari area, with a special focus on the sector of information and 
communication technology.  It argues that, while the ICT sector has become in 
time a significant industrial reality in the Cagliari area, it has not reached the 
dimensions and status of a veritable technology district, and the drive for 
innovation and corporate success appears to have lost its momentum.  
The first chapter offers an overview of the infrastructural endowment of the 
island of Sardinia and the Cagliari area in particular: transport, 
telecommunications, education and research.  Chapter two describes the main 
features of the economy of the Cagliari Local Work System in 2001, the last 
available industrial survey.  The local ICT sector is analysed in chapter three, 
while Tiscali’s origin and evolution are described in chapter four. Chapter five 
investigates the legacy and role of Tiscali in the sector, based on the information 
obtained by discussions with other major ICT outfits in the Cagliari area.  Our 
conclusions are presented in Chapter six.  
1. General Description 
The island of Sardinia, with its 24.089 square Km surface land, is the second 
largest island of the Mediterranean and one of the least developed areas of Italy. 
It is part of the aggregation of southern regions collectively known as 
Mezzogiorno1, which are characterised by lower levels of development, 
occupation and education relative to both the (more affluent) north of Italy and 
the country average. Compared to other Mezzogiorno regions, Sardinia is more 
sparsely populated and more isolated from the mainland. Within the island there 
are also significant differences in the level of development and infrastructure 
endowment. Broadly speaking, the central-western mountains around Nuoro 
host the most isolated and traditional communities, whose economies are based 
on agriculture, sheep rearing and small crafts, while the coastal areas and the 
south tend to be more affluent and developed. If we were to rank the (current) 
                                                 
1 The area known as Mezzogiorno includes six regions of southern Italy (Basilicata, Abbruzzo, 
Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia) and the two islands of  Sicily and Sardinia. 
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four provinces in order of development, Cagliari would lead, followed by 
Sassari, Oristano and Nuoro2. 
Table 1: land and population (year 2000) 
 SURFACE 
(km2) 
POPULATION 
(‘000) 
POP 
/km2 
Italy (1999) 301,268 57,679.9 191.5 
Mezzogiorno  123, 063 20,850.15 169 
Sardinia 24,089 1,648.04 68 
Sassari Province 7,519 459.14 61 
Oristano Province 2,630 156.64 60 
Nuoro Province 7,043 267.99 38 
Cagliari Province 6,895 764.25 111 
Cagliari LWS 1,824 469.93 257 
Source: Annuario Statistico della Sardegna 2003, Osservatorio Industriale della 
Sardegna, and ISTAT 2001 
 
Cagliari is the main administrative and trading centre of Sardinia; it hosts the 
most important port and airport of the island as well as the key industrial areas; 
its Local Work System3 (LWS) is the focus of our analysis.  While the city has 
steadily lost inhabitants in the last ten years, and now numbers about 165,000, 
the metropolitan area which gravitates around it has continued to expand. 
Cagliari’s LWS is today a large territory encompassing 32 small municipalities; it 
covers just 8% of the island territory but houses 28% of the population.  It is 
one of the widest Work Systems in Italy as well as the most densely populated 
and urbanised on the island of Sardinia.   
Infrastructure. Sardinia is characterised by a low level of local infrastructure, 
particularly in the area of transport, not only in relation to the national average, 
but also when compared to the average values for the Mezzogiorno regions.  
Table shows the main indicators of general economic infrastructure for Sardinia 
and for the province of Cagliari. While the same indicators are not available for 
Cagliari’s LWS, it is safe to infer that the metropolitan area would exhibit equal 
or slightly higher values than the province, since most infrastructures are 
concentrated in and around the town and access to it is therefore easiest for 
those near the city. In both areas the only item that exceeds the national value is 
that of ports.  Indicators for the province of Cagliari are generally higher than 
those for Sardinia as a whole, with the exception of airports and road networks.  
                                                 
2 Additional provincial administrative units will be formed in the coming months, following a 
referendum held in 2003. 
3 The Local Work System is an aggregation of municipalities that gravitate around a given centre, 
where workers and economic activity tend to converge.  It is devised to account for workers who 
commute to a centre while residing in another.  
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Table 2: general infrastructure indexes (1999) 
Italy =100 Sardinia Cagliari province 
Road network 63.2 54.5 
Rail network 24.5 24.7 
Ports 132.9 156.9 
Airports 77.0 62.3 
Energy and environmental 
network and infrastructure 
30.5 51.4 
Telecommunications 
networks and structures 
32.8 51.6 
Bank networks and services 48.1 60.4 
General economic 
infrastructures 
58.4 66.0 
Source: Atlante della competitività delle province in www.unioncamere.it  
 
The island is served by 70 ports and three international airports4 (two in the 
north and one in the south).  Based on the levels of traffic in 2003, all three 
Sardinian airports are classified as middle sized.  Cagliari Elmas, the busiest 
Sardinian airport, moved a tenth of the passengers that went through Rome’s 
airport in the same year5. The international airport serving Cagliari has been 
substantially renovated and expanded in 2003, but it still relies on just one 
runway. 
The island has a very outdated network of roads and is the only Italian region 
without any motorway. As a result, connections are less safe and take a longer 
time. The ratio of roads to surface in Sardinia is lower than average: 
12.9km/km2 for state roads compared to 15.5 nationally and 17.6 in the 
southern regions. The limited accessibility and poor state of the local roads is a 
main factor contributing to the relative isolation of many local communities. 
According to the general infrastructure indicators discussed above, the province 
of Cagliari ranks 101st in Italy (out of a possible 103) for its road infrastructure 
and 98th for its rail network. 
Rail transport too is largely deficient. Not only is the rail network extension 
limited (18m/km2, compared to an Italian average of 55m/km2), but, more 
importantly, its quality is extremely low: the network is not electrified and has 
the lowest percentage of dual track infrastructure in Italy (4% - the 
                                                 
4 By way of comparison, the more populous island of Sicily, with nearly 5 million inhabitants, has 2 
airports and 132 ports. 
5 Rome’s airport handled 48 times the amount of goods that passed through Cagliari Elmas in 2003. 
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corresponding national figure is 38%). As a consequence, most of the passenger 
and goods traffic in Sardinia travels on the roads, thus compounding the 
inconvenience of the inadequate road network. In fact, public transport is 
mainly road based, and is complemented by the services of private operators.  
 
Broadband. The indicator for telecommunication infrastructure puts the 
province of Cagliari at roughly half of the national average.  However, these 
measurements, which refer to 1999, do not tell us much about the area’s 
broadband endowments.  Broadband is defined as “mix of technologies that enable 
greater speed of communication in general and Internet access in particular, as well a high level 
of interaction, through innovative techniques/infrastructures”6.  Its development is a 
primary goal of the European Union.   
The overarching objective of the latest EU Action Plan, e-Europe 2004, is to 
“make Europe, by 2010, the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world, improving its employment level and social cohesion”7. In order to realize this 
objective, Europe must be endowed with broadband infrastructure over which 
to offer innovative and competitive digital services. The key problem in doing 
this is the proverbial chicken and egg dilemma, that is the paradox that broadband 
networks will not be developed until there is demand for (broadband hungry) 
services and advanced services cannot proliferate without the appropriate 
infrastructure to support them.  The Union therefore sees the joint development 
of broadband technology and interactive services as key to the real growth of 
the European Information Society, and has devised a range of incentives to 
stimulate broadband investments as well as the provision of advanced digital 
services.  
Broadband can be offered through several technologies, wired and wireless.  
Presently, the most significant in Europe are: Universal Mobile Technology 
Standard (UMTS), Asynchronous Digital Subscriber Loop (ADSL), and cable 
modems. Cable modems are used in the fibre (or mixed coaxial-fibre) networks 
of cable TV operators; they are widely available in most major EU countries but 
hardly in Italy, where cable television is in its infancy8 and only one operator, 
Fastweb, who does not operate in Sardinia, is investing in fibre to the homes to 
provide integrated cable TV and telecommunications services.  
ADSL is the most popular of the xDSL family of wired broadband 
technologies, especially for residential customers.  The Italian network’s circuits 
at the level of the final user are short (on average 1.5 km), which means that 
                                                 
6 from www.osservatoriobandalarga.it 
7 COM (2002) 263 final. 
8 Telecom Italia spun off a cable TV company called Stream in the early 90s, mainly to prevent entry 
in that market.  Stream did very little cable business and eventually moved its offer on satellite to 
compete with the dominant operator Tele+.  The two satellite competitors were bought by 
NewsCorp in 2003 and merged in the new Sky Italia. 
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most users can get high quality results from the xDSL technology.  At the end 
of 2003, only 58,9% of copper twists had been used for xDSL nationally. 
Figure 1: availability of broadband in Sardinia, Dec.2003 
Source: Osservatorio Banda Larga, Between 2004 
Figure one displays the coverage of different broadband technologies on the 
island of Sardinia: the red areas are reached only by satellite coverage, the yellow 
areas are covered by both satellite and ADSL and the green areas have also a 
third option of local loop unbundling (LLU9). Wired broadband coverage on the 
island is low:  41% to 55% of the population can get ADSL (as well as HDSL, 
SHDSL and UMTS).  Fibre density in the network is also rather low10.  There 
are less than 5Km of fibre per km2 in both backbone and Metropolitan Area 
Networks11.  New fibre MANs are planned for Cagliari (and two other local 
cities) in the near future.   
Very few operators are investing in infrastructure on the island: with only three 
active competitors in 2004, Telecom Italia, Wind and 3,  Sardinia is the last 
Italian region in the rankings for infrastructure competition.  Less then 10% of 
the local population can access broadband with unbundling, and, as the map 
shows, only if located near the town of Cagliari.  In mainland Italy LLU is 
available for a quarter of the population.  
                                                 
9 LLU refers to the ability of a telecom operator to compete fully even in the last mile of the 
network 
10 The national average is higher at 75%. 
11 This indicator is the ratio of fibre posed over total km2 of land in the region observed.  Source: 
Osservatorio Banda Larga e Between, rapporto 2004. www.osservatoriobandalarga.it 
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Education and Research. The gap in development between Sardinia 
and the rest of Italy maintains in the field of education and research. Italy is not 
a particularly good performer, as far as education and research are concerned, 
given that nearly 70% of the population has not gone beyond 8 years of 
schooling, as shown in Table 3.  Furthermore, OECD reported that, in 2000, 
Italy spent 2.3% of its GDP in Research & Development (R&D), secondary 
education and software12, compared to an OECD average equal to 4.8% of 
GDP.  Considering the low national level of investment in research, the picture 
for laggard Sardinia seems rather bleak.  
Table 3:  percentage of total population by education  level,  2002 
 SARDINIA MEZZOGIORNO ITALY 
University degree and above 5.2 5.5 6.4 
High school diploma 19.7 20.5 21.0 
Vocational qualifications 2.4 2.2 4.4 
Middle/Junior High diploma 33.6 30.0 29.0 
Primary school or less 39.1 41.8 39.2 
Source: Osservatorio Industriale della Sardegna, 2004  
 
The vast majority of the island’s population has low levels of education: in 2002 
the proportion of Sardinians with only primary school exceeded 39%, while a 
further 34% has (the equivalent of) a high school diploma. In the same year, 
5.2% of the Sardinian population had a university degree of any type, and  the 
majority (60%) of these are women.  
The two major cities, Cagliari and Sassari, host a local university each, but extra-
mural courses are also arranged in smaller centres like Oristano and Nuoro.  
The University of Cagliari, created in 1620, offers around 30 degrees from its 10 
faculties and 43 departments, including a three-year degree13 in Information 
Technology within the department of Mathematics.  The IT degree is opened to 
a limited number of students (210 in the AA 2004/05), divided between the 
main Cagliari campus and four small centres of the island, where lessons are 
offered as distant learning on ICT support.  On average, the University has 
around 40,000 registered students, but considering the extremely high dropout 
rates of Italian universities (65%14), only a minority of the students is likely to 
obtain a degree.   In fact, each year some 3300 new students graduate from the 
two Sardinian universities 
                                                 
12 Only Portugal and Poland had lower values than Italy according to the 2003 OECD Science and 
Technology Scoreboard 
13 Shorter degrees (three instead of four years) have been recently introduced in the Italian higher 
education system to improve flexibility and reduce the drop-out rate.   
14 According to a research conducted by Fondazione Agnelli and reported by the national newspaper 
La Repubblica on 6.10.2000 
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As well as its core educational activity, the University of Cagliari conducts a 
wide range of research.  It is organized in 14 (independent) research centres, 
spanning areas from sports to biotechnology. 
 
A growing number of businesses are involved in Research and Development 
activities. In 2001, 177 production units in the Cagliari LWS were registered in 
the field of R&D, employing over 500 people, as illustrated by Table.  While the 
number of units has grown on average 12% a year between 1999 and 2001, the 
number of workers has not grown proportionally, especially in the field of 
engineering and natural sciences.  The average size of R&D firms in this field 
has hence decreased from 7.73 to 3.12 in the same decade.  
Table 4: Research activity  
   2001 a.y.c. 91-01 ave.  
  units workers units workers Size 
R&D engineering etc. 119 437 10% 1% 3,67 
R&D social science  58 115 14% 9% 1,98 
TOTAL R&D 177 552 12% 2% 3,12 
Source: ISTAT 2001 
 
In the field of ICT, the two most influential research centres of the island are 
Polaris, the Science and Technology Park, and CRS4, a non-profit consortium 
of public and private companies created within the Park.  Both outfits were 
established as part of a European project designed to improve technology 
transfers within the Union.  The regional administration governing Sardinia in 
the late 80s chose to invest heavily in the creation of local knowledge through a 
series of complementary measures, which included direct investment in research 
structures.  The main project entailed setting up a consortium - named Consorzio 
21 after the law that established it (L.R. 21 of 1985) - charged with promoting, 
implementing and managing a Science and Technology Park for Sardinia. The 
consortium became operational in 1989 and it commenced its work by 
developing 
• CRS4, a centre for international excellence and innovation in the field 
of computing and large scale calculations, established in 1990  
• The Science and Technology Park, Polaris, a network structure for 
research and other services for businesses, whose headquarters 
officially opened in 2003.  
CRS4 was charged with the mission of attracting investments and off-spinning 
technological start-ups. The centre’s membership is shared by Consorzio 21 
(representing the Sardinian administration), Techso, IBM Italy, ST 
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Microelectronics (member since 1993), Saras, Tiscali (since 1998) and the 
Universities of Cagliari and Sassari.  The Department of Electrical and 
Electronic Engineering of the University of Cagliari, in particular, has an on-
going cooperation protocol with the CRS4 centre and its eighty researchers.  
The first director of CRS4 was Nobel Laureate Carlo Rubbia, who was also in 
charge of the CERN research centre in Geneva (Switzerland).  At the time 
(1990) the Geneva centre had gained a major role in popularising Internet, when 
its researcher Tim Berners Lee “created” the World Wide Web.  Under Rubbia’s 
leadership, CRS4 too rapidly developed significant expertise in the new fields of 
digital communication technologies, drawing to the island world class 
researchers and state of the art knowledge and experimentations.  
CRS4 is widely quoted as the single most significant contribution to the creation 
of knowledge on the island in the last decade, supplying the fertile soil that 
nurtured the most innovative ICT companies in Sardinia.  The local 
competences created by the centre were absolutely essential to the development 
of Tiscali.  However, as CRS4 directors and local governments changed, and 
creating and funding local knowledge became a lower public sector priority.  
CRS4 professionals were asked to find private finance for growing shares of 
their output, and most public support was in the form of short term funds, thus 
preventing more visionary and long term projects to take off.  Today CRS4 is 
hoping to restore its edge in pre-competitive research with the renewed 
leadership of Prof. Rubbia.   
While CRS4 was established in relatively little time, setting up the Science and 
Technology Park Polaris required nearly ten more years: the Park’s headquarters 
were officially opened only in June 2003.  
Polaris is “a system of advanced infrastructure for the localization of innovative firms and 
R&D centres, as well as a system of services for innovation aimed at local SMEs”15. Its 
main objectives are:  
• Supporting high-tech start ups in Sardinia 
• Supplying  a range of business services to promote technology transfer 
and  innovation in local companies 
• Attracting new investments to Sardinia 
Polaris is articulated in four network centres and two main laboratories. The 
R&D centre located at the headquarters in Pula, near Cagliari, which also hosts 
CRS4, maintains the original specialisation in digital communication 
technologies, but also promotes research on pharmacology and genomics. The 
second research centre, based in Alghero on the north-western coast, specialises 
in biotechnologies applied to agriculture.   
                                                 
15 Information from the official site www.polaris.c21.it (our translation). 
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Polaris’ new headquarters are located in a beautiful nature park by Pula, some 30 
km west of Cagliari.  As well as libraries, laboratories, media centres and campus 
facilities, the technology park includes Polaris’ Internet Farm, created for new 
high-tech firms.  The idea is to co-hosts ICT companies in the same location in 
order to share central services as well as exploit synergies and knowledge spill-
overs from CRS4.  However, since the Internet Farm relocated in the Park, the 
13 ‘incubated’ ICT companies in Polaris have reduced to just six, with two more 
applying to move in the farm at the time of writing16.  For some companies it 
was simply time to move the first steps alone, but for others the move may be 
motivated by the new location. Some of the Consorzio 21 professionals we 
interviewed suspect that the splendid isolation and distance from Cagliari, 
though suitable for research activity, may pose too many difficulties for the 
companies’ commercial contacts and trade.  An Internet farm addressing the 
needs of start-ups, like Polaris’, deals by definition with small companies that are 
yet to grow.    Furthermore, the vast majority of Sardinian companies remain 
very small - often a one-man-band - and therefore the research, business and 
sales personnel are often one and the same person.   
2. The local economy 
Sardinia’s local economy represents a small portion of the Italian economy as a 
whole. In 2001 its gross domestic product (GDP) was €26.3 billion17, which 
represents 2% of the national GDP. The island’s share of national value added 
is also 2%.  
Sardinia relies mainly on the tertiary sector, which produces over three quarters 
of the local value added, while industry contributes for nearly 20% of value 
added and agriculture provides the balance, as illustrated in  
 
Table. Within the island, the area surrounding Cagliari has the greatest economic 
significance and produces nearly a third (32.33%) of the island’s value added, 
even though it hosts 28% of the population.  While Sardinia has a greater share 
of value added coming from agriculture than Italy as a whole (4.2% versus 
2.7%), the metropolitan area of Cagliari produces only 1,8% of its total value 
added through agriculture, and is relatively specialised in the service sector. In 
fact, Cagliari’s LWS has experienced a decline of the agricultural sector during 
the five years 1995-2000, which was partly absorbed by growth in services. 
Industry has remained relatively stable. 
 
                                                 
16 The companies currently hosted in the farm are Axis, Leaderchip, Micro, Staget, Sardegna 
Innovazione, Edulife (only company to come from continental Italy).  Econfidence and Look Up 
are expected to join in the near future. (source Consorzio 21 R&D dept. )  
17 source: Annuario Statistico della Sardegna 2003, table 10.1a 
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Table 5: 2000 value added by sector and geographical area 
 € millions % 
Agriculture 26,292 2.77 
Manufacturing 265,960 27.99 
Services 657,895 69.24 
Italy 
Total 950,146 100.00 
Agriculture 840 4.21 
Manufacturing 3956 19.81 
Services 15,177 75.99 
Sardinia 
Total 19,973 100.00 
Agriculture 116 1.80 
Manufacturing 1190 18.43 
Services 5,151 79.77 
Cagliari LWS 
Total 6,457 100.00 
Source: Crenos, Il Quadro Macroeconomico del Sistema Produttivo Locale di Cagliari, 2004 
 
Value added per inhabitant is higher in Cagliari’s LWS than in the island of 
Sardinia, and is closer to the average values of northern Italy.  If we consider 
value added per worker, however, the values for Cagliari are closer to average 
values for the Mezzogiorno regions. This is due to the twin influences of work 
inefficiencies and of low employment levels, which are also, sadly, aligned to the 
levels prevailing in the Mezzogiorno.  
Economic activity is relatively well concentrated in Cagliari’s LWS, which hosts 
38% of the total Sardinian production units18. In the 10 years leading to 2001 
the number of units has increased in this area more than any other on the island: 
2.8% per year on average in Cagliari, in contrast with an increase of 1.9 in the 
province and 1.4 in the island on the whole.  Real estate, rentals, IT, research, 
consulting registered the highest activity growth rate. Unemployment level in 
Cagliari has remained more than double the national rate through the decade 
The average size of local firms is 4.2 workers per firm, a reduction from the 
1991 value of 4.8.   The small dimension of firms is not just a Sardinian 
phenomenon: nearly 95% of Italian companies are micro (up to two employees).  
In Sardinia micro firms account for 97.4% of the total. Such small size is a 
constraint on firm’s ability to grow as well as their ability to invest in new 
                                                 
18 ISTAT data uses local production units rather than firms, thus allocating production to the territory 
where it originates rather than to the firm’s headquarters. 
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technologies and reap the benefits of ICT adoption. Recent research19 has 
shown that in Italy it is the largest companies (250 employees and up) that are 
making the most of the new technologies: they were responsible for 56% of 
2002 total IT expenditure even though they account for 0.07% of firms. The 
same research suggests that for small companies ICT investments imply 
organisational changes that they are not prepared to face.  The small size of local 
firms, together with the low level of infrastructural development are the main 
constraints to growth and to inbound investment.  
In Cagliari, wholesale and retail distribution, auto repairs and personal goods make up the 
largest sector of economic activity. It groups over 30% of the production units 
and employs 18.5% of the total.   The second most important area of activity is 
real estate, leasing, IT, research, professional services.  
The 2001 specialisation index show that Cagliari has a degree of relative 
specialization in heavy industry, particularly oil refineries, mostly a heritage of 
the investments conducted in the 1960-70.  The largest industrial group on the 
island (SARAS) is active in this field.  Here too the number of active firms has 
increased, but its workforce reduced by almost 3% a year. Other areas of relative 
specialisation in manufacturing include paper and publishing, which has been 
characterised by slow yet steady growth in the past ten years, mechanical repairs 
and installations (where employment has also increased), electrical and optical 
machinery and rubber and plastics.  Within the service sector, real estate IT, 
research and professional services, transport and communications and financial 
services show the highest specialisation indexes. 
3. Information and communications technology  
Information and communications technologies20 (ICTs) are at the core of the 
enormous world wide changes in production, distribution and lifestyle that 
materialised in the last 20 years. Their impact has been likened to that of major 
industrial turning points such as the introduction of electricity or railroads.  In 
the nineties, investments in ICT have fuelled the longest period of non-
inflationary growth in the United States, the largest producer and user of ICT in 
                                                 
19 Assinform, Federcomin, Anasin.  Occupazione e formazione nell’ICT – rapporto 2002 
20 We adopt here the OECD definition of Information and Communications Technologies: “the 
combination of manufacturing and services that transmit, receive and display electronically data and information”  
This definition therefore includes companies  
I. whose products display and process electronic information 
II. whose products use electronic processes to measure, control or record physical phenomena  
III. whose activity facilitates communication and processing of information through electronic 
instruments 
(from OECD: measuring the Information Economy, 2000).  This is a wider definition than that 
adopted nationally by the Italian Ministry of Innovation and Technology, which includes mainly the 
firms active in the areas (i) and (iii) above. (from OECD: measuring the Information Economy, 
2000) 
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the world, and have resulted in significant productivity increases in many other 
industrialised countries.    
After analysing ICT investments in a number of countries, OECD research21 
has suggested that the countries that benefited most from their ICT investments 
were those that have sustained ICT investments with appropriate micro-
economic reforms.  
It has also been claimed that ICTs have the potential to change economic and 
social geography, since they abolish the economic significance of distance.  The 
evidence on this claim, however, is less consistent.  In the first place, distance is 
truly abolished only for goods or activities that are immaterial and totally 
digitizable, while for all other goods there is still a positive cost related to 
distance (both in terms of time spent travelling and cost of shipping).  Secondly, 
ICTs can significantly reduce the costs of (remote) product specification, 
production schedules and quality control, but only insofar as the products are 
standardized and the relevant information easily ‘codifiable’.  The computer 
industry is a prime example of business transformed by Internet: price 
competition is driven by value added distributors who purchase components 
from the cheapest locations of the world, and assemble it to the specifications 
of the final purchasers.  For products where frequent design changes and 
continuous improvements are important, the new technologies cannot 
effectively substitute face-to-face meetings because the relevant information is 
not easy to codify, and production is likely to remain close to the final market.  
In these instances, the new technologies are likely to cause faster product cycles 
rather than relocation to cheaper production locations. 
Indeed, alongside the forces that pull production towards countries 
characterised by cheaper factor costs, there are opposite forces that push it 
towards sophisticated markets.  Markets with a strong network of business and 
professional services, for example, will continue to attract firms even though 
they may not have the cheapest factor prices.  Also, businesses that need 
specialised labour, such as ICT production, follow the spatial patterns of 
knowledge-intensive industries, and therefore tend to cluster around centres of 
excellence (be it in research and/or business) and become entrenched in them 
through virtuous circles of knowledge spill-overs and cumulative growth.  
Finally, firms prefer to locate in markets characterised by a degree of 
transparency.  In other words, firms tend to go where it is easier to manage their 
business and to benchmark against other players.  
On the other hand, the use of ICTs and Internet enable businesses to search the 
globe for clients (or conversely, for low cost suppliers) with greater ease and 
virtually no expense.  EBay and Amazon are well known examples of businesses 
                                                 
21 See OECD 2001 “The New Economy: Beyond the Hype” and OECD 2003 “ICT and Economic 
Growth.  Results from countries, industries and firms”. 
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that have gone global using the Internet as their exclusive marketplace.  
However, the power of internet as a global marketplace can be easily overstated.  
Though growing, e-commerce is still a minority activity in many European 
countries.  In Italy, in particular, only 1.647 million out of 22 million users22 
regularly purchased from the web in 2003.  As A.J. Venables has powerfully 
argued23: “the internet is excellent for acquiring information, but information is a necessary 
but by no means a sufficient condition for completing a trade”. 
ICTs in Italy. In Italy, many have looked at ICTs as the technological 
paradigm that could enable the country’s Mezzogiorno to leapfrog technology 
and catch up with the more affluent northern areas.  Indeed, while a few 
promising industrial clusters seem to emerge in the south, especially in 
Campania, Sicily and Sardinia24, Italy as a whole did not exhibit evidence of an 
ICT-led general productivity increase in the 90s.  Nationally, average growth of 
Labour Productivity in the mid nineties was 1.1%, a lower value than the 
previous decade, when it grew on average 2%25. A deceleration of Total Factor 
Productivity, which lessened its growth from 1.4% to 0.8% in the same period, 
caused the lower labour productivity level.  In the present chapter we will briefly 
examine the national Italian context and then analyse the patterns of ICT 
production and diffusion in the Cagliari area.  
The Italian ICT market was worth around 67.2 billion euros in 200326, thus 
making Italy the fourth largest market in the EU after France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom.  Telecommunications take the lion’s share of the market, with 
nearly two thirds of the total, and the service component of the 
telecommunications sector is responsible for half the national market.   
When it comes to ICT production, Italy ranks 6th in Europe.  Like all industrial 
production in the country, ICT production is concentrated in the north and 
centre27.  Northern Italy has larger and more sophisticated businesses for the 
local ICT companies to service, as well as consumers with greater disposable 
income. Central government and publicly owned companies are headquartered 
in Rome and feed a healthy ICT local industry.  Conversely, ICT companies in 
the south tend to be smaller and less specialised than their northern 
counterparts, as they address the simpler needs of small businesses and families 
                                                 
22 From Osservatorio Anee 2003, www.assinform.it  
23 Venables A.J.: Geography and International Inequalities: the impact of new technologies, May 
2001 
24 see for example: Del Monte “Esiste un Nuovo Mezzogiorno? Alcuni Protagonisti del Sud nei 
Settori dell’Information and Communications Technology” 2002 and A.  Ferrucci, D. Porcheddu 
“La New Economy nel Mezzogiorno” 2004 
25 see for example Brandolini e Cipollone, 2003, “Una Nuova Economia in Italia?” In Rossi, S. “La 
Nuova Economia: i fatti dietro il mito, Il Mulino.  
26 From EITO yearbook 2004 
27 North-western Italy, the most industrialised area of the country,  hosts 30% of the national 
industry and 37% of the Italian ICT sector. 
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rather than the sophisticated demands of large corporations. Average ICT firm 
size is 6.22 nationally, 6.89 in north-western Italy and 4.92 in Cagliari.  
On the supply side, the IT sector has a greater presence than 
telecommunications: it has five times the number of production units and twice 
the employment level. The IT industry is made up of many relatively small 
outfits (average size is only 4.81 workers per unit), and the top companies are 
usually the Italian chapter of large multinationals like Microsoft, HP, Cisco, and 
so on.  In telecommunications, large companies are more common (average 
firm size is 13.14) and several of the industry champions are local firms, such as 
the incumbent Telecom Italia, the mobile phone company Wind (wholly owned 
by the electricity distributor ENEL) and, indeed, the Sardinian champion 
Tiscali. Several of the top revenue-making companies in Italy are 
telecommunication service companies.   
ICT market in Sardinia. No information is available on the size of the local 
ICT market in Sardinia, but regional data on IT expenditure, which is 
summarised by Table below, is accessible through the national association of IT 
producers. In 2003 Sardinia spent over €230 thousand on IT, and if we assume 
the same ratio of IT to telecom expenditure as in Italy, then the ICT total is 
three times the IT expenditure.  This guestimate of the local 2003 ICT market 
would then be in the region of €610 million.  
Table 6: IT expenditure in Sardinia 
Euro ‘000  2001 2002 2003 
IT expenditure total 229,574 217,226 203,693 
% of national IT expenditure 1.12 1.08 1.05 
IT expenditure per employee (Italy = € 880) 429 400 372 
IT expenditure as % of value added (Italy =1.65% ) - - 0.80% 
Source: Assinform 2004 
Sardinia is among the five smallest IT regional markets in Italy, and accounts for 
just over 1% of the national total. Its relative weight has slightly decreased in the 
last three years.  As the national IT market experienced a downturn in the last 
few years, so did Sardinian IT expenditure.  In fact, the island experienced the 
largest negative variation in the country for the year: (-)6.2 %, compared to (-
)3.2% nationally. Sardinia has also the negative record of the lowest level of IT 
expenditure per employee, which, at €372, is only 41% of the national average 
value of €880. Furthermore, this figure has declined by 7.1% in 2003 after 
contracting 6.7% in the previous year.  The ratio of IT expenditure to locally 
produced value added also shows Sardinia trailing behind all other regions of 
Italy at 0.8%. The small size of the local market appears to be compounded by 
low levels of local investment in IT, putting Sardinia at the rear end of the 
national scale.  
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E-government is supposed to play an essential role in stimulating demand for 
advanced interactive services. The regional administration of Sardinia prepared a 
thorough plan for information society on the island in the year 200028, and with 
some updating the plan was approved in October 2002.  Numerous initiatives to 
stimulate adoption of the new technologies and provision of innovative, 
interactive services are now in place.  Generally speaking, e-government 
initiatives on the island can be divided into three main strands: 
• Information Society projects developed and financed locally 
• projects financed through EU regional development funds 
• Projects co-sponsored by the Ministry of Innovation and Technology. 
Local IS projects involve all levels of local government, from region to province 
to municipality and even community.  The cornerstone of the Regional 
administration plan approved in 2002 was an infrastructural project, RUPAR, an 
acronym for “network of the regional PA”, which so far has failed to materialise. 
The creation of a dedicated network for the regional administration, connecting 
public databanks and services to local administrations and other government 
bodies, should proceed in parallel with the development of a national RUPA.  
The Ministry for Innovation and Technology, however, has now replaced the 
concept of national and regional RUPA(R) with that of “system of public 
connectivity” (SPC), in view of the fact that the network must be an 
interconnecting system characterised by common technical and graphic 
standards.  In 2004, Sardinia earmarked €3.14 million for further development 
of its broadband RUPAR. 
E-learning is the other key project in the Sardinian information society plan; the 
project MARTE entails supply of IT labs in all schools (primary to high schools) 
as well as distance teaching and training for teachers.   
Drawing on the EU regional funds, Sardinia set up the DIESIS projects29, five 
pilot projects in the key areas of e-commerce, e-learning, e-tourism, e-
government and knowledge management. The CRS4 centre coordinates the five 
areas and is directly in charge of the knowledge management pilot.  Tiscali is 
also involved and powers the project’s website. These projects, particularly the 
e-tourism module, were surrounded by controversy as local IT companies 
complained that tender procedures were clouded by political interference. The 
matter is presently in front of the administrative tribunal.  
Three projects set up by Sardinian local administrations were also selected by 
the Italian Ministry for Innovation, which co-finances 50% of the undertakings 
                                                 
28 Regione Autonoma della Sardegna, “Strategia per lo Sviluppo della Società dell’Informazione in 
Sardegna”, Ott. 2002.  Available from www.regione.sardegna.it  
29 DIESIS stands for Digital Innovative Exploits for a Sardinian Information Society. See 
www.diesis-sardegna.it  
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rated best in each of its two public competitions (in 2002 and 2004).  Rather 
than infrastructure, all Sardinian projects aim to offer services for citizens and 
businesses.   
ICT production. Sardinian ICT production is a small fraction of the national 
total: 2.4% of firms and 1.3% of workers.  The local ICT sector represents 
2.62% of Sardinian production units, and 3.47% of employed workers.  This 
indicates a slightly higher incidence for the ICT sector in Sardinia than found in 
the Mezzogiorno regions taken together (2.21%) even though it remains below 
the national average value of 3.21%.  Following a previous analysis of the ICT 
industry in Italy30 we constructed concentration and specialization indexes for 
the island as well as the Cagliari area.  The first indicator is simply the local 
quota of ICT workers over the national total, the second is a ratio of the local 
ICT concentration over the local quota of manufacturing and tertiary sector 
workers.  The results, reported in Table 7, are very low for both Cagliari and 
Sardinia.  When it comes to regional concentration, for example, the highest 
value was found in Lombardy, with 26.7% of national ICT workers. The above-
mentioned 2001 research found the highest levels of relative specialisation (that 
is, values greater than one)  in the LWSs of Milan (19.08), Firenze (2.43) and 
Genoa (1.92)31. 
Table 7: ICT concentration and specialization indexes 
 concentration specialisation 
Sardinia 1.27% 0.65 
Cagliari  0.70% 0.69 
Source: our calculations from ISTAT 2004 
 
Table 8 below describes the ICT industry by main sector in the national, 
regional and local context.  The majority of Sardinian ICT firms (85%) are active 
in the IT industry, particularly in the area of IT services, and services altogether 
are predominant in the local ICT sector.  Following the pattern of most local 
firms, the ICT outfits tend to be small (4.92 workers on average) and generally 
configured as “ditte individuali”, i.e. the simplest form of individually-owned 
company. However, there is a much higher incidence of limited companies32 in 
this sector than there is in the Sardinian industry on the whole (52.4% in the 
ICT sector vs. 27.6% in overall industry).  
                                                 
30 G. Iuzzolino, “Struttura dell’Offerta e Divari Territoriali nella Filiera dell’Information and 
Communications Technoloy in Italia”, Banca d’Italia, Temi di Discussione # 421, 2001.  
31 The 2001 study used data from the 1996 Census, as the 2001data was not yet available,  our 
calculations, using 2001 data, yield slightly different values of relative specialisation. 
32While there is no exact equivalent to a British Limited Company in the Italian system, the “società di 
persone” and “società di capitali” which together make up 52% of companies, are the format closest 
to a limited company. 
 18
Table 8: Composition of the ICT sector - 2001 
Local production units Italy Sardinia Cagliari 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
office equipment, computers and hardware  1,715 47 25 
cables and wires 580 3 0 
broadcasting and telco transmitters, receivers, 
components  
9,680 224 71 
instruments for navigation, measurements and 
control 
2,404 33 22 
equipment for monitoring and controlling 
industrial processes 
1,162 5 0 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  
appliances, radio and TV equipment 8,808 119 67 
 office equipment and hardware 7,101 131 63 
 other industrial machinery 8,071 131 67 
s e r v i c e s  
Telecommunication services 2,186 59 32 
Leasing of office equipment and hardware 253 5 3 
IT and related services 84,102 1,720 758 
TOTAL ICT 126,062 2,477 1,108 
Source: our calculations from ISTAT 2004 
 
ICT production. Cagliari is the main production base of the ICT sector in 
Sardinia, with nearly 45% of the island’s units located in its metropolitan area.  
The service sector is predominant: 72% of production units and 75% of the 
workforce.  On its own, the telecommunications service sector employs 28% of 
the sector total and exhibits the highest average firm size, at 49.19. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 shows that most of the ICT sectors have experienced positive growth in 
the decade considered.  Among them, hardware production in particular has 
exhibited double digit growth in both production units and labour force.  
Conversely, manufacturing of cables and equipment for control of industrial 
processes have disappeared in the course of the nineties.  IT and related services 
represent the second strongest growth with the ICT sector, for both production 
and employment. 
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Table 9: ICT production by sector in Cagliari, 1991 and 2001 
 1991 2001 91/01 1991 2001 91/01 2001 
 units A.Y.C. workers A.Y.C. ave size 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
office equipment, 
computers and hardware  5 25 16.1% 24 101 14.4% 4.04 
cables and wires 1 0 - 2 0 - - 
broadcasting and telco 
transmitters, receivers, 
components 
76 71 -0.7% 642 476 -3% 6.70 
instruments for navigation, 
measurements and control 17 22 2.6% 72 101 3.4% 4.59 
equipment for monitoring 
and controlling industrial 
processes 
1 0 - 3 0 - - 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  
appliances, radio and TV 
equipment 73 67 -0.9% 378 268 -3.4% 4.00 
 office equipment and 
hardware 46 63 3.1% 198 218 1.0% 3.46 
 other industrial machinery 50 67 2.9% 172 224 2.6% 3.34 
s e r v i c e s  
Telecommunication 
services 39 32 -2.0% 1568 1574 0.04% 49.19 
Leasing of office 
equipment and hardware 0 3 - 0 10 - 3.33 
IT and related services 368 758 7.2% 1387 2479 5.8% 3.27 
T O T A L  I C T  676 1 108 4.9% 4 446 5 451 2.0% 4.92 
Source: our calculations from ISTAT 2004 
 
Table 10 provides a breakdown of the main areas of IT service.  In 2001, the 
two key IT activities in Cagliari were data processing and software supply.   
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 Table 10: IT services in Cagliari 
 1991 2001 91/01 1991 2001 91/01 avrg 
 units A.Y.C. workers A.Y.C size 
consulting on 
system installation  19 16 -1.7% 107 27 -13.8% 1.69 
Software houses 89 201 8.1% 400 1186 10.9% 5.90 
data processing 192 318 5.0% 586 742 2.4% 2.33 
database 4 7 5.6% 11 14 2.4% 2.00 
hardware 
maintenance and 
repairs  41 66 4.8% 195 170 -1.4% 2.58 
robotics eidomatics 
etc. 3 30 23.0% 27 75 10.2% 2.50 
other IT activities 
(web) 20 120 17.9% 61 265 14.7% 2.21 
Source: our calculations from ISTAT 2004 
 
Data processing is conducted predominantly by small local accounting firms 
that prepare and certify accounts in electronic format.  They represent therefore 
a “modernised” version of the legal / accounting profession.  These firms have 
grown in number at an average rate of 5% a year (1991-2001), and in 2001 they 
employed nearly 750 people, showing an average size of just 2.33 workers.  
Numbering 201 in 2001, software houses are the second largest group.  They 
have increased at a yearly rate of 8.1% in the decade, generating an even larger 
increase (10.9%) in the number of workers employed in this sub-sector. Because 
of the presence of a few relatively large players (>100 employees), software 
houses have the largest average firm size in the local IT service sector, at 5.9.   
In February 200433, the Osservatorio Industriale della Sardegna conducted an in-
depth survey based on a representative sample of 122 Sardinian firms active in 
                                                 
33 F. Manca, C. Murroni, C. Persico,” Le Industrie delle Tecnologie dell’Informazione e della 
Comunicazione in Sardegna”, Osservatorio Industriale della Sardegna, June 2004.  Wholesale and 
retail distribution were not included in the sample. The study recorded no significant difference 
between Cagliari and other production locations on the island.  
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ICT manufacturing and services.  According to the survey, software houses 
(22% of the sample) offer a range of services:  
• personalised software solutions for their clients (74%),  
• training (63%),  
• off-the shelf software packages (52%) technical assistance (52%),  
• consulting on system design and installation (44%).  
 
Web services are offered as a secondary activity by over 25% of the firms 
contacted, but only a minority (five companies in the survey) make this their 
principal activity. In the Cagliari area, however, companies registered as 
providers of web services such as web hosting, housing, e-commerce, portals 
and websites have increased six fold between 1991 and 2001 – a double digit 
annual growth of 17.9  - and have exhibited the highest yearly increase in the 
number of workers of the ICT sector (14.7%).  In the same period, their weight 
in the Cagliari ICT sector rose from 3% to 11%.  The fastest growing IT area is 
‘robotics, eidomatics etc’ (mainly creation and processing of electronic images), 
where the number of companies has increased 10-fold in the period considered.  
After IT-related activities, telecommunication services make up the most 
important ICT activity in the Cagliari area.  In the survey mentioned above, as 
well as having the largest firm size, telecommunications services operators were 
found to be predominantly limited companies (hence with a more sophisticated set 
up than normal), belonging to the upper income group (€ 1-25 million a year). 
Even though the number of local production units offering telecommunication 
services has decreased between 1991-2001, the overall number of employees in 
the sector has shown a modest increase. 
The survey also investigated the relations between the ICT sector and the local 
market, asking companies to report on their backward and forward links as well 
as their chosen methods for researching and contacting suppliers, clients and 
personnel.   
By and large, Sardinian ICT companies show a greater inclination to expand 
their markets than firms in other industrial sectors, but they are nevertheless 
much less “connected” with the outside world than their Italian and European 
counterparts.  While the majority of surveyed companies have email (84%), only 
44% have a website. Both values are low, especially considering that the firms 
contacted are supposed to be the high tech sector on the island! 
The survey found that 28% of respondent firms only use Sardinian suppliers, 
while 42% use both local and mainland suppliers.  A minority of firms (13%) 
also access EU and other international markets for their supplies. 
Table 11: Sardinian ICT firms by location of suppliers 
Sample = 122 firms number % 
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Only use Sardinian suppliers 34 27.9% 
Only use Italian suppliers 21 17.2% 
Use both Sardinian and other Italian suppliers 51 41.8% 
Use suppliers from anywhere 10 8.2% 
Use suppliers from anywhere but none local 6 4.9% 
Source: Osservatorio Industriale della Sardegna 2004 
The survey proceeded to investigate on the preferred ways of searching for 
suppliers, focussing on supplies of ICT goods or services.  Respondents were 
asked to rate the relevance of different methods.   
For 70% of the companies contacted, personal contacts or word of mouth are 
the main mechanisms for finding suppliers.  Internet is a distant second: while 
47% of respondents consider the net “very important” for finding new 
suppliers, more than half gave it little or no importance.  A disquieting 30% 
rated it absolutely “unimportant”.  Trade fairs proved to be the most unpopular 
searching method. 
Internet appears to be more relevant as a communications tool to keep in touch 
with existing relations, for which purpose it is rated just below telephone and 
fax.  While the phone is important for 93% of respondents, the net is for so for 
70%.  The relevance of personal meetings for on-going communication with 
suppliers is modest: 38% of respondents found face to face meetings to be 
important for keeping in touch with suppliers. 
These findings suggest that in the case of Sardinian ICT producers, the majority 
of local entrepreneurs prefer to deal with the environment they know rather 
than venturing into the unfamiliar.  Cultural barriers can be an obstacle to the 
efficient use of the new technologies. The face-to-face interviews we conducted 
also suggested a certain cultural resistance to networking and sharing resources, 
which could be important ways of overcoming some of the problems stemming 
from small size.  The main cultural obstacle is a generalised diffidence; together 
with the belief that the local market is so small that sharing equals losing a 
precious slice of it.  
When it comes to their downstream markets, Sardinian ICT firms are even more 
locally orientated: word of mouth and personal contacts are overwhelmingly 
more popular than the establishment of an independent sales force or even 
traditional advertising.  Novel methods of advertising, such as web banners, 
search engine marketing and web promotion in general are used more often 
than traditional broadcast and press advertising, probably because of their lower 
costs.  In both cases, however, the percentage of companies who advertise 
regularly is extremely low.   
Just under a quarter of the sample sells both in Sardinia and in mainland Italy, 
while two thirds of the companies contacted only sell on the island. The 
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percentage of Sardinian ICT firms that export their product to Europe and the 
rest of the world is just over 12%.  This is a higher proportion of export-
oriented firms than found in overall manufacturing. 
 
 
 
Table 12: Sardinian ICT firms by location of final market 
Sample = 122 firms % 
Only sell in Sardinia  65.5 
Sell in Sardinia and rest of Italy 24.6 
Sell anywhere 6.5 
Do not sell locally  2.4 
Source: Osservatorio Industriale della Sardegna 2004 
Companies were also asked to report on their average number of clients in the 
year to date.  The majority of contacted firms (47%) declared to have more than 
100 clients. This appears to be a positive factor, as a large number of clients 
usually translates into higher and steadier volumes of sales.  However, this 
finding also seems to confirm the results of research from Assinform34, which 
pointed out that ICT companies in the Mezzogiorno regions of Italy need to 
invoice many more clients than their northern counterparts in order to obtain 
the same level of sales, because their lower specialisation results in lower 
earnings per client.   
Call centres. Our analysis so far has not considered call centres.  Even 
though they are not part of the ICT definition, and are classified differently in 
official statistics, call centres deserve a special mention.  Call centres use 
telecommunications and software solutions to offer data intensive services, 
usually customer service or reservations for third parties.  As technological 
progress and liberalization contributed to drastically reduce the cost of 
communications, many back office activities of large multinational companies 
have been outsourced to call centres conveniently located in low salary 
areas/countries.  Call centres do not require specialised workforce, but only 
pleasant manners and use of the required language(s).  Given its vast pool of 
workers in search of employment, it is little surprise that Sardinia has a 
significant presence of call centres.  In the Cagliari area, nearly a thousand 
people work in call centres, which is more than the employees of agriculture and 
fisheries put together.    
                                                 
34 Assinform, Federcomin, Anasin.  Occupazione e formazione nell’ICT – rapporto 2002 
 24
Table 13: Call centres in Cagliari LWS 
Local production units workers 
1991 2001 1991 2001 
67 343 186 949 
Source: ISTAT 2004 
All in all, the ICT industry in Sardinia is a sector of growing importance, 
considering that in less than 15 years it has earned relevance comparable to that 
of the well-established sectors of restaurants and hotels, for both production 
units and workers.  ICT now employs six times as many workers as petrol and 
chemicals – for many years the most important economic activity on the island.  
Relative to the other sectors of production, it is also a moderately sophisticated 
and international division.  When compared to ICT productions of northern 
Italy and Europe, however, the Sardinian clusters look small and lack 
specialisation.  There is no evidence of a growing division of labour among the 
local outfits, which could result into a local integration of production along the 
lines of the Italian industrial districts.  There the small size of the individual 
firms is overcome by the overall size of the district, where companies are 
integrated vertically and engage in cooperative competition.  Here, as we will 
argue later, companies are small and seem unwilling to grow.  
4. Tiscali 
The origins of Tiscali, the European ISP created in Cagliari in 1998, can be 
linked back to a series of events that unfolded in the preceding decade.  
In the late ‘80s, Cagliari, and Sardinia as a whole, were confronted with the 
decline of the island’s traditional industries: mining, chemicals and agriculture. 
The prevailing industrial model in manufacturing - direct involvement of the 
Italian state in productive activities – was also in decline.  The Sardinian 
administration in power at the time was therefore charged with the task of 
creating a new model of sustainable development for the island. The 
administration identified a new and promising development path in the field of 
knowledge-intensive industries in general, and advanced mathematical 
calculation in particular. It thus resolved to invest heavily in the creation of local 
knowledge through a series of complementary measures, ranging from post 
graduate scholarships for Sardinian students to direct investment in research 
structures.  Within this context, as discussed in  the General Description,  
Consorzio 21 was created in 1985 to develop and manage the Science and 
Technology Park.  By the end of 1990,  the digital research centre CRS4 was up 
and running, and it rapidly established itself as an international centre of 
excellence for innovative digital technologies.  Cross fertilizations between the 
centre and the main media outfit in Sardinia (L’Unione Sarda) produced a chain 
of events that gave life to a few remarkable start-ups: 
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• The first web page in Italy; www.crs4.it (1993) 
• The first newspaper on line in Italy: l’Unione Sarda on line (1994); 
• A pioneering national Internet Provider, Video on Line (1994-96), 
from the same local newsprint company 
• The first national provider of free internet services: Tiscali (1998) 
The idea behind Video on Line (VoL) was to create a community of users that 
could access content and services on the web in many different languages; a 
model that added an international and exquisitely Mediterranean dimension by 
offering services in many minor local languages. Though visionary and 
innovative, these experiments did not last. Video on Line became a casualty, as 
the incumbent Telecom Italia bought the new outfit and put an end to its 
development in 1996. On one hand, the state of competition in the Italian 
telecommunications sector was still embryonic and as a result Video on Line 
was heavily indebted with Telecom Italia. On the other hand, Internet was a 
little known platform and the popularisation of Internet services required either 
very deep pockets or risk capital – neither of which was at hand.  
After acquiring the local ISP, Telecom Italia developed its own internet 
company and transferred most related competences from Cagliari to the 
mainland, leaving only the customer service unit on the island. 
Still, the net result of these events was the creation of a pool of advanced local 
skills in a new area of telecommunications where even the national incumbent 
had little or no experience: at the time, most of the (few) Italian people who 
knew something about Internet were based in Cagliari.  
The start of Tiscali in 199835 was undoubtedly the most significant circumstance 
of the decade for the Cagliari area. Many of the human resources that had 
acquired new competences through CRS4 and Video on Line contributed to the 
shaping of Tiscali in its early years.  Tiscali’s founder, Renato Soru, had made his 
first mark in the ISP business as a manager of the Video on Line’s Czech 
division.  As Telecom Italia moved its network division out of Sardinia, Tiscali’s 
growth fed off it, proceeding in parallel with the gradual reduction of the 
incumbent’s local presence.  Because of the legacy of Video on Line and 
Telecom Italia, local human resources were capable of developing and managing 
an innovative new business like Tiscali.  
The first business model adopted by the company was based on three main 
lines of revenue: voice, internet and business services.   
Tiscali sought and obtained a full telecommunications licence from the Italian 
Ministry of Communications, in order to tap immediately on the more mature 
voice telephony market, where Telecom Italia had seen relatively little challenge. 
                                                 
35 The company was formed in 1997 but began operations in 1998 
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Initially licensed to work as a regional operator in Sardinia, Tiscali obtained a 
national licence in early 1999.  The voice segment was crucial for short term 
success and the establishment of Tiscali in Italy, a country still relatively 
unexposed to competition36. Firstly, voice had a much higher earning potential 
at the time, while Internet had a modest penetration in Italy. Voice revenues 
dominated the company’s turnover in 1998 and 1999: figure 3 shows that they 
accounted for nearly ¾ of sales in 1998 and over 60% in the following year.  
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, voice was a strategic asset for running 
an internet business with high margins.  EU telecom regulation is in fact based 
on the principle of “network competition37”, that is competition between 
telephone companies operating their own networks.  This implies that 
regulation is engineered to provide incentives for companies to build alternative 
telecommunications network, as opposed to renting the incumbents’ network 
and supplying services over it.  Although mere service providers are also 
protected by regulation, they are given ‘lesser’ interconnection rights, so to 
speak, compared to alternative network operators, who therefore can operate 
services on higher margins and thus repay their (larger) investments.  The full 
telecommunications licence thus meant that Tiscali could negotiate 
interconnection charges for its Internet business with the incumbent rather than 
buy wholesale connectivity which was more expensive and less flexible.  In fact, 
Tiscali pioneered the Reverse  Access Charges, a  payment system whereby the 
incumbent pays for traffic to the new entrant’s dial-up access number. Rather 
than exposing itself to Telecom Italia, as Video on Line had done, Tiscali earned 
income from the incumbent as its business expanded. Voice was therefore a 
short term, albeit strategic, business.  Once competition drove down the high 
margin of the voice business, voice services would remain a strategic 
complement to B2B and web based services.   
From the onset, however, Tiscali operated an IP based network, which offered 
crucial economies of scope with the growing data and internet markets.  The 
company expected these markets to rapidly overtake voice services and was 
eager to create a vast community of users, a critical mass around the company’s 
portal.  Revenue would flow not only from the minutes of internet traffic, but 
especially from advertising and distribution services based around the portal.  
Confident that on line advertising and ecommerce would be the major earners 
in the future, Tiscali began looking for strategic content.  In early 1999 it 
acquired Infomedia srl, a company that had developed important software for e-
commerce and e-payments, and thus commenced its drive to own valuable 
content.   
                                                 
36 The first telecom licences for alternative operators were issued only in 1998. 
37 For a discussion of the principles underpinning European telecom regulation, see Collins R. and 
Murroni C. New Media New Policy, Polity Press ,1996. 
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Also, analysts and financial markets were extremely enthusiastic about internet 
businesses internationally and internet companies were rewarded awesomely by 
the stock markets, even though there were few established internet operators 
and it was still unclear which internet business model would survive in the 
medium term.  
After a year of successfully retailing voice services in carrier selection and prepaid 
telephone cards mode, in March 1999 the company launched “Tiscali FreeNet”, the 
first free internet access service in Italy: a move that shook the market and 
established Tiscali as a national innovator.  In its first three months, with 
coverage limited to Sardinia, Rome and Milan, FreeNet earned 216,000 
customers.  Six months later it was attracting as many as 4,000 customers a 
day38.  Other national operators slowly followed.   
In October 1999 the company launched an Initial Public Offering in the Italian 
New Market and began raising financing for its European expansion. Fuelled by 
the market euphoria for New Economy listings, Tiscali’s debut on the financial 
markets was so successful that at one point the Sardinian company had greater 
capitalisation than Italian car maker Fiat39.  
A European company. Following its debut on the Nuovo Mercato, Tiscali 
began focussing on its internet strategy, aiming at a top position in Europe.  It 
had three strategic objectives: 
• building a critical mass of users throughout Europe to exploit 
economies of scale and scope 
• developing a range of web-based services and content to attract 
visitors to its portals 
• gaining a foothold in the emerging mobile and fixed broadband 
technologies40 
To realise such objectives, Tiscali went on an acquisition spree that saw the 
company rapidly move to the top league of European ISPs. The acquisitions, 
described in Table 4, were made to gain market share in other European 
countries as well as to obtain strategic network and content assets.  Chief among 
                                                 
38 From Tiscali’s IPO, 22 October 1999 
39 Financial Times, 2001: “Before the correction in high-tech stocks provoked by the falls in the 
US Nasdaq exchange, Tiscali, Italy's free Internet pioneer floated on the Milan new market for high 
growth stocks last October, had seen its market capitalisation overtake that of Fiat. The vehicle 
group is now back ahead although Tiscali's capitalisation has still grown from US$6.3bn at the 
beginning of the year to nearly US$11bn in April.”  
40 While the vast majority of internet connections at this point were dial-up, broadband technologies 
were already at the horizon.  The EU was preparing the first round of frequency auctions for UMTS 
technology and the Union’s telecommunications policy was actively promoting broadband through a 
diverse mix of technology. 
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them was the merger with the Dutch company World on Line, which 
represented the quantum leap that made Tiscali a major international company.  
With this acquisition, Tiscali graduated from being a fast growing independent 
telecom operator in Italy, to being one of Europe’s chief Internet 
Communication Company.  
Table 14: Tiscali Acquisitions, 1999 - 2000 
INFOMEDIA SRL (Italy) 
ENERGY BYTE (joint venture – Marton srl 45%) 
1999 
NETs SA (France) 
GILLA spa (joint venture – Sonera 50%) 
DATACOMM AG (Switzerland) 
TELEKOMUNIKACE (Czech Republic ) 
LINK LINE (Belgium) 
NIKOMA BETEILIGUNGS GmbH (Germany) 
INTERWEB SPRL (Belgium) 
WORLD ON LINE (Netherlands)  
A TELECOM SA (France) 
IDEARE spa (Italy) 
STS  (Italy – 50%) 
FREETRAVEL (Italy – 50%) 
MOTORCITY  (Italy – 60%) 
BEST ENGINEERING spa  (Italy) 
QUINARY spa  (Italy) 
2000 
ANNUNCI GRATUITI  (Italy) 
Source: http://investors.tiscali.com  
 
The Dutch company World on Line had a market capitalisation of € 4.5 billion 
and 4 million subscribers41. It also had peering agreements with TIER1 
operators in both US and EU networks, a key strategic asset which allowed it to 
swap bandwidth freely with other international carriers.  Its merger with Tiscali 
(who had 2.3 million subscribers at the time) created a new company with initial 
market capitalisation of €12.5 billion42 and   
• The largest pan-European footprint covering 15 countries 
• The top 3 positions in 5 countries (by subscribers)  
                                                 
41 From 2000 archives at  www.ispreview.co.uk 
42 pro forma figures from Tiscali’s company literature on the merger, www.tiscali.com/investors   
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• The largest pan-European internet community with 6.1m registered 
subscribers (3.5m active) 
• The second largest subscriber base in Europe 
The management of the newly formed group, which was headed by Tiscali’s 
founder Renato Soru, comprised managers from both companies, including 
Ruud Huisman, who would eventually became Tiscali’s CEO in May 2004, as 
Soru began his political campaign to become Sardinia’s first elected governor43.  
In the year 2000 most EU countries set up their first auction for UMTS 
frequencies.  The European Union had put great emphasis on the development 
of this broadband mobile technology, as cellular phones (and the European 
GSM standard) had proven a great success throughout the continent, and 
reached significantly higher penetration than in the USA.  If a similar success 
story could be replicated with UMTS, then Europe would enjoy the widespread 
broadband penetration it needed for full development of interactive digital 
services.  Tiscali, too, considered UMTS to be a strategic technology in which it 
should be involved, particularly since it would provide a channel to supply 
broadband without depending on Telecom Italia.  Fixed broadband services 
were proving too expensive to market if supplied through the incumbent’s 
network, and regulation did not yet allow competitive provision at the last mile.  
Tiscali’s controlled subsidiary Andala UMTS bid for one of five licences 
auctioned by the Italian government in early 2000, as part of the H3G 
consortium based in Cagliari.  The consortium, in which Hutchison Whampoa 
had nearly 80% of the capital, was granted a licence in October.  However, 
during these months, technological listings began to fall and eventually crashed 
in most international markets: the speculative bubble that had magnified them 
for the last few years finally burst, and operators world wide had to deal with 
huge debts as well as needing new ways to finance their investments. 
Fortunately, Tiscali had engineered many of its acquisitions as a share-swap and 
therefore was not impaired by the market crash.  However, the huge 
investments required to buy the UMTS licence (which were auctioned at very 
high, pre-crash prices) and to roll out the network, caused Tiscali to re-think its 
strategy and reduce its participation in the H3G consortium to 0.3%44.  The 
consortium’s headquarters moved to Milan from Cagliari, where H3G maintains 
a call centre.  Tiscali’s acquisition drive also ebbed noticeably.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Since June 2004, Mr. Soru is the head of the Autonomous Region of Sardinia 
44 Tiscali press release 12.07.01 
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Table 15: Tiscali Acquisitions 2000-2003 
EXCITE ITALIA 
PLANET INTERKOM GERMAN 
SURF EU 
2001 
SPRING BOARD Internet Services Limited  
AIRTELNET (Spain) 
WANADOO BELGIUM N.V. (Belgium) 
TISCALI INTERNET LTD (UK) 
HOME.SE.AB (Sweden) 
NEXTRA SPA (Italy) 
EUNET EDV (Austria) 
CABLE & WIRELESS Domestic Internet Business (France) 
2003 
NPOWER (UK) 
Source: http://investors.tiscali.com  
 
With the vast expansion of the company, Tiscali group’s revenues have grown 
enormously: average annual growth from 1998 to 2003 was 96%.  The group’s 
performance is summarised in figure 2 below. 
figure 2: turnover of the Tiscali group (€ mln) 
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source: www.tiscali.com 
 
Tiscali’s IP based network also enlarged with each acquisition.  At the time of 
writing, Tiscalis’s network has a 12,000 km fibre backbone that crosses all of 
Europe and a series of Metropolitan Area Networks, covering over 30 major 
European cities and reaching a total of 60 points of presence. The backbone is 
interconnected with the national Tiscali network and enables the company to 
reduce costs drastically.  Considering all the aggregate network properties of 
Tiscali, the network covers over 50,000 km.  Tiscali has over 300 peering 
partners all over the world.  This way, users can connect to the Tiscali 
backbone, known as ‘Autonomous System 3257’, and have immediate access to 
more than 60% of all the routes on the global Internet Routing Table.  Tiscali’s 
International Network Operation Centre monitors proactively the backbone 
and services, so that this single contact point can manage and follow up any 
problem on the entire international network from the Cagliari headquarters.  
The international economic slowdown and ensuing reduction in advertising 
revenue during the last few years have affected the business model initially 
forecast by the European ISP.  As figure 3 indicates, e-commerce and portal 
revenue did not overtake access revenue after all.  Access has remained the main 
source of income, responsible for nearly 70% of the company’s turnover in the 
last two years.  However the new trend was for broadband rather than dial-up 
access, that is, access with much greater speed and capacity.  Broadband access, 
therefore, became the key focus for Tiscali, and its founder began campaigning 
in front of the EU commission in July 2002 for deregulation of the local loop.  
figure 3: incidence of  different lines of revenue over company turnover, 
1998-2003 
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source: www.tiscali.com/investors  
Indeed, the importance of broadband access has grown throughout Europe the 
last few years, and Tiscali is betting heavily on broadband development. ADSL 
is now responsible of 41% of the group’s access revenues and nearly a quarter 
24% of overall revenues.  The company connected 1.542 million customers 
throughout Europe by 30 September 2004 and expects to have 1.7 million by 
year end.   
figure 4: broadband customers of the Tiscali group at 31.03.2004 
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source: www.tiscali.com/investors  
 
Tiscali’s current business model can be summarised as follows: 
1. Access services 
Narrowband and broadband access to internet through a portfolio of platforms 
(from dial-up to x-DSL and satellite broadband) constitutes the chief line of 
business for Tiscali.  The two types of access underline, however, two very 
different types of business for the supplier. In the dial-up narrowband 
environment, most customers enjoy free Internet access, and revenue comes 
from reverse access charges.  In order to increase profits, companies keep the 
free packages very basic and try to get customers to upgrade to premium 
services (greater mail-box capacity, antivirus, anti spam) for a small fee.  
However, to get customers to pay for something that they enjoyed for free is 
notoriously a difficult task, and therefore other advanced services, such as voice 
over IP, unified messaging and voice portal services complement the access 
package.    
Broadband access is on subscription, and has therefore a potentially more stable 
revenue model.  The vast majority of Tiscali’s ADSL customers, particularly in 
Italy and France, are serviced through wholesale re-selling of the incumbent 
network’s functionality, rather than unbundling of the local loop (LLU), at the 
time of writing.  Broadband profitability depends on the operating margin 
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available after paying the incumbent for its services.   According to Tiscali’s 
literature, while broadband based on wholesaling has lower profit margins than 
dial-up, unbundling would raise the provider’s margins to nearly 70%45.  But this 
option requires investments in the local loop. As we will discuss with greater 
detail later, Tiscali’s ability to undertake the necessary investments for 
unbundling ADSL in Italy (as announced in August 2004) is heavily conditional 
on the company’s cash position.  Many analysts are casting doubts on the 
company’s ability raise enough cash through asset sales in the current year to 
finance its future growth46.  Despite this surrounding pessimism, Tiscali 
announced in late 200447 the launch of new fast ADSL subscription packages, 
based on local unbundling, following investments in Italy France and the 
Netherlands48.  In the near future, Tiscali’s unbundled ADSL subscribers will be 
offered “triple play”: broadband access, voice and content services.  The voice 
package entails a flat rate fee for unlimited IP calls through the telephone, which 
would allow Tiscali’s LLU ADSL clients to cease renting the line from the 
incumbent.  
2. Content distribution 
Tiscali offers a wide range of content, e-commerce and advertising 
opportunities through its portal.  Revenues come from advertising, which 
depends on the number of users/hits, and from distribution, which pays a fee 
per transaction.  These lines of business grow with the number of users who 
access the portal, but unlike access fees, which are non-cyclical, they tend to 
follow the ups and downs of the economy. During bad times companies 
advertise less, and the volume and value of most transactions fall.    Broadband 
access impacts positively on content revenues, since its superior speed makes it 
easier to download content or buy products on line.  Attractive content, which 
draws customers to the portal and makes them stay on line as long as possible, 
is therefore a crucial ingredient of a successful broadband business.   Tiscali’s 
2004 portals, renovated in their graphics and content, offer many dedicated 
channels such as Music, Finance, Games, Motoring and Sports.  The majority of 
channels offer free downloads, news, surveys and specialist information; a few 
also offer pay services.  With broadband access, ISPs are (or strive to be) in 
direct competition with other digital content providers, such as broadcasters and 
cable TV operators.  The history of pay-TV and subscription content has shown 
that sports, films and music – in that order - are the three crucial revenue 
drivers.  Tiscali has been a first mover in the music arena, offering legal 
downloads of digital music as early as February 2003 – a service called Super 
                                                 
45 Tiscali results from 2nd quarter 2004, from www.tiscali.com 
46 see for example Carlo Castelli of Actinvest (London ) in www.ispreview.co.uk or Hugo Dixon’s 
“Breaking Views” feature on La Repubblica (7.8.04) www.repubblica.it  
47 Tiscali Press Release 14.10.2004 
48 Tiscali Press Release 12.11.2004 
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Sonic Selector49. A platform for movie downloads was launched in Italy, 
Denmark and the UK in 2004: Cinema Now offers digital movies for €2.99.  By 
way of comparison, satellite pay per view movies retail between €5.00 and €6.00, 
but they offer a much wider selection, more novelties and can be easily obtained 
even by “low tech” customers.  In Italy, Tiscali’s sport offers appear to be 
lacking: no pay content is available to complement the photo-gallery, survey, 
games and news sections.  Alice, Telecom Italia’s ADSL division, offers live 
Serie A  (top division) football on their site, both pay-per-view (€2.5) and on 
monthly subscription (€5), as well as movies and other premium content from 
the group’s generalist TV channel La7.  RossoAlice is now one of the most 
visited websites in the country.  Fibre operator Fastweb retails the Sky TV 
football matches at €12-€15 per match, as well as offering a virtual movie 
archive at €5.90 per month plus PPV fee.  In the area of premium content, 
Tiscali laments their difficult negotiating position with rights owners compared 
with the incumbent and the main broadcasters in each country.   
3. Business services 
Tiscali is able to offer telephony, Internet connection and data transmission 
services along a single network connection, which can include direct circuits for 
connecting branches, disaster recovery procedure circuits and mainframe 
interconnections.  The company has pledged to dedicate more resources in the 
near future to this line of business, which currently provides 18% of the group 
revenue (FY 2003) but only 5% of the parent company’s income.  
The company’s results for the first nine months of 2004 were presented in mid-
November.  Compared with the first nine months of 2003, Tiscali’s revenues 
were up by 24%, to € 808.7 million and gross profit increased by 11%.  
However, the gross margin narrowed from 50% to 45% this time, because of 
the lower profitability of ADSL services sold on a wholesale basis. 
Table 16: Tiscali latest results, 3Q 2004 
2004 (9 MONTHS) 
REVENUES €  808. 671 m 
ACCESS € 549.3 m 
PORTAL € 33.1 m 
B2B € 154.9 m 
VOICE € 66.1 m 
EBTIDA € 74.9 m 
TOTAL cash and cash equivalents € 133.3 m  
Source: www.tiscali.com 
                                                 
49 see www.tiscali.it/musica  
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As Table 6 indicates, access was the major earner, responsible for 68% of total 
revenues, which is the same percentage as FY 20003, totalling € 549.3 million.  
Portal revenues fell by 5% to €33.1 million compared to the first nine months of 
last year, while business service revenues gained 40% and reached € 154.9 
million.  Finally, voice services brought in € 66.1 million, or 9% of total 
revenues.  
Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA), which is 
an indicator of profitability used to make comparisons across industries, in the 
first nine months of 2004 was € 74 million, a 57% increase on the level recorded 
in the same period of 2003.  Pre-tax loss was also smaller than last year (€33.3m 
versus €73.6m) or even last quarter (€65.5).  
However, Tiscali’s cash flow has been a source of concern for most analysts, 
especially considering the 250 million bond repayment due in 2005, which casts 
a great shadow over Tiscali’s future.  With cash flow reduced by two previous 
years of economic stagnation, uneasy stock markets and  the need to invest in 
LLU in key countries, Tiscali opted for a strategic downsizing, announcing in 
mid-2004 the sale of non-strategic assets (in Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Belgium and South Africa) acquired during its expansion years.  The first asset 
disposal was the sale of Tiscali Österreich GmbH, the Austrian outfit, ceded to 
Nextra for €12 million, in August 2004.  Sale of the Norwegian assets (to 
Telenor for approximately €6 million), the South African ISP and the cell phone 
company (subject to regulatory approval, for €40 and €5.3 million, respectively), 
the Swedish and the Swiss company (for 13 million and 5.1 million, respectively) 
was announced a few weeks later.  The Belgian company was sold in December. 
Rumours of a possible takeover, however, continued to spread in 2004.  
At the end of September 2004, the group had liquid financial resources of 
€133m, while the net debt was €382.4 million.  
In Italy, commercial ADSL offers have began in 199950, and have accelerated in 
the last quarter of 2003.  The National Regulatory Authority, who sets the price 
and conditions for wholesale access to and for unbundling of the local network, 
indicated in early 200451 that LLU provision of broadband services had been 
minimal and that the alternative option of a shared permanent virtual channel 
had seen no take up at all.  It reported also operators’ complaints of the 
incumbent’s delay tactics and other examples of behaviour aimed at frustrating 
competition, which were specifically addressed in the NRA 2004 determination 
on pricing and conditions of broadband services.    
                                                 
50 Ref. OECD Working Party on Telecommunication and information services policies; ‘The 
Development Of Broadband Access In Rural And Remote Areas’, 10.05.2004 
51 see Delibera 3/04/CIR published on 28.05.04 
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The needed impetus for broadband take up came in 2003 in the form of 
government incentives for broadband operators (a €75 refund per new ADSL 
customer).  The incentives and the heavy marketing campaigns that followed 
produced the highest acceleration of broadband take up in Europe in 2003, 
driving ADSL penetration to 5.5 million households in January 2004.  All the 
main telecommunications operators now offer competitive ADSL packages, 
mostly reselling wholesale ADSL functionality from the Telecom Italia network.  
The incumbent had upgraded its network making ADSL services available on 
80% of the national network since the end of 2003.  Wind and Fastweb are the 
only operators connecting residential customers through LLU at the present 
time, and only the former is active in the Cagliari area. Its ADSL customers in 
Italy represent 14% of the group’s total, which is, nearly 185,000 users52.    
Tiscali has pledged to offer LLU connections in the near future.  However, at 
the time of writing, there was no evidence of local investments in the Cagliari 
area.  In its early days, the company had regarded Cagliari as a priority for 
investment (it was awarded a local licence before the national one), but in 
broadband the national competitor Wind has began marketing direct 
connections to both business and residential customers in 2003, and Tiscali is 
lagging behind.   
Table 17: Tiscali broadband products, Italy 2004 
 TECHNOLOGY COST SUBSCRIBERS 
SATELLITE Satellite fast 
connections and LANs 
€80 - €199 
per  month 
business 
TISCALI 
ADSL 
ADSL 2M, 6M, 12M Flat:€29.95 – 
€99.99 
free:€1.8 per 
hour 
residential 
TISCALI 
HDSL 
HDSL 12 Mbps Ad hoc business 
Source: www.tiscali.it 
 
In addition to xDSL broadband, Tiscali offers fast satellite connections through 
Eutelsat, up to 2 Mbps.  This type of connection, which uses the POTS 
telephone network for upstream traffic and the satellite bandwidth for 
downstream, is available everywhere, and is particularly suitable for rural and 
low density areas.  The only competitor in Italy for this technology is the 
incumbent Telecom Italia, which uses the Astra family of satellites.   
The figure 5 describes the contribution of the different business segments to the 
turnover of the parent company Tiscali s.p.a. in the FY 2003.   
                                                 
52 Telecom Italia boasts over 2.5 million ADSL customers by the 2nd quarter 2004.  
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figure 5: composition of revenue, Tiscali Italia 2003 
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source: 2003 Annual Report, in  www.tiscali.com 
 
It confirms that Tiscali addresses mainly (or more successfully) the residential 
market: access is the main revenue line, with over half of the total income, while 
B2B services are a mere 5%.  Compared to the revenue split of the previous 
year, portal revenues decreased (from 20 to 14 million and from 14% to 8% of 
the total) while access takings have increased 10% - from 67 to 99 million.  
While a decrease in portal income can be attributed to the general economic 
slowdown, the boost of access revenues is mainly due to the improved 
penetration of broadband.  The partial reports for 2004 confirm the growing 
trend for broadband customers.  
From the initial core group of 45 employees in 1998, the parent company 
headquartered in Cagliari has grown to employ 861 people in 2003, while the 
Tiscali group had 3,226 employees.  Tiscali is the largest employer in the ICT 
sector in Cagliari, possibly matched by the incumbent Telecom Italia, if all 
companies of the TI group are taken into consideration53.  The company Tiscali 
S.p.a. has just restructured its assets, grouping all Italian activities into Tiscali 
s.r.l and all services supplied by italy to the group business into Tiscali Service 
S.r.l..  Both new companies are wholly owned and controlled by Tiscali S.p.a. 
and the restructuring was performed to improve transparency and accountability 
within the group54.  
                                                 
53 Unfortunately employment figures for Telecom Italia and Telecom Italia Mobile are available only 
on a national basis,  not disaggregated by production unit.  
54 Tiscali Press Release of 3.01.2005 
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figure 6: Employees of Tiscali s.p.a. 
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source: Annual Reports in www.tiscali.com 
 
As well as being part of the CRS4 consortium, Tiscali has actively promoted the 
concept of distance learning, particularly attractive for a sparsely populated land 
such as Sardinia.  In 2000, Tiscali teamed up with Credito Industriale Sardo, a 
local development bank, and the University of Cagliari to offer remote 
university degree courses in Ilbono and Sorgono, two small villages in the 
mountainous centre of the island.  The project was very successful and two 
more villages in the province of Cagliari were added by 2003.   Currently, 120 
students can earn a short IT degree through e-learning – even though they must 
attend classes in Cagliari during their third and final year.  Also in 2003, the 
company began a sponsor program for PhD students of the University’s 
Electronic Engineering department: Tiscali offers a three-year scholarship to 
four graduate students, who conduct their research at Tiscali’s headquarters.  
There is, however, no formal commitment to future relationships between the 
students and the company.  
Tiscali’s new headquarters at Sa Illetta (officially opened in summer 2003), are 
the site of Cagliari’s own Telecommunication Pole, according to a three-party 
agreement signed in 2001 between Tiscali, the Municipality of Cagliari and the 
Autonomous Region of Sardinia.  The Telecommunication Pole is composed by 
the new Tiscali headquarters and a number of infrastructure and research 
facilities, in the same compound, for high-tech companies in the ICT or 
biotechnology business (both technical and support facilities, such as nursery, 
school, catering…).  The Sardinian region earmarked €15 million for the 
development of the Pole’s advanced infrastructure, but so far no other company 
has officially located there.  
Tiscali is the only newly-formed company in the Cagliari area which can boast 
the numbers of a company of international calibre. It is among the largest 
companies in Sardinia for turnover and number of employees; it is one of the 
most European orientated as well as the only publicly quoted company on the 
island. 
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5. In depth and up to date: other ICT firms in Cagliari 
While the chain of events and local innovations that led to Tiscali’s creation is 
relatively well documented55, very little has been written on the relationship 
between Tiscali and its local peers.  Can we identify a cluster of high tech 
companies in Cagliari? Is there evidence that points to the development of an 
ICT district? The present section elaborates on the results of several interviews 
with leading ICT companies in the Cagliari area. As well as talking to those who 
work with ICT companies within Consorzio 21, we selected a panel of 
companies, which are described in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  below, based on the following criteria:  
• Size – the largest in terms of turnover and/or employees 
• Age – the companies that have been active for the longest time 
• Core product – a cross section of different ICT activities 
• Referral – interviewees were asked for suggestions on the most 
innovative or interesting companies to question 
The overall objective of the interviews was that of gaining a deeper 
understanding of the local sector, by investigating its research activity, the 
upstream and downstream links within the industry, and the wider relations 
within the Sardinian market.  
                                                 
55 as well as numerous articles in the local and international press, see in particular L. 
Ferrucci e D. Porcheddu 2004 op. cit., Del Monte 2001 op. cit. 
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Table 18 : overview of surveyed ICT companies in Cagliari 
 
COMPANY 
 
CORE 
PRODUCT 
2002 
TURNOVER 
(€ ‘000) 
2004 
EMPLOYEE
S 
2004 
LOCAL 
SALES 
ABBEYNET Audio video 
streaming 
1,560. 50 0% -1% 
AKHELA* Software 
House 
1,486 53 n.a. 
ATLANTIS Digital 
territorial 
management  
1,092 110 n.a. 
AXIS Web 
communication 
and software 
n.a. 15 60% 
DATAREX Manufacturing 
of diskettes 
and CD-R 
2,876 24 1% - 1.5% 
ENERGIT Networked 
utilities (energy, 
telecom) 
17,428 36 15% 
PRODINSAR Software 
House 
n.a. 1 100% 
SCELTA Software 
House, web 
services 
n.a. 5 50% - 75% 
SOLEJA Web 
advertising 
1,500 15 35% 
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agency 
STELNET Web 
information 
agency 
n.a. 10 20% 
SYS 
INFORMATICA 
Software 
House 
n.a. 6 100% 
Source: our interviews and Bureau Van Dyke’ s AIDA data base 
* The turnover reported is that of SarasLab - now operating under the new name Akhela 
 
Even though our conversations highlighted a number of drawbacks and 
limitations of the local market, the general outlook obtained from the panel of 
ICT companies is positive.   
The first positive trend is the consolidation of a number of small successful 
companies into larger competitive outfits.  The absence of large companies and 
a “critical mass” in the local cluster is one of the main weaknesses of the Cagliari 
economy, and consolidation is therefore a refreshing development.   
The merger of SarasLab, FST, Techne and Vox, into the new company Akhela 
is the most high profile example of this trend.  The newly formed company 
Akhela is now one of the largest local ICT company (180 employees), and has 
highly specialist skills: embedded software and system-on-chip, focussing on IT 
security, IT consolidation and IT services based on Linux/Open Source 
software. Most of the companies now consolidated in Akhela were nurtured by 
the largest local industrial group, Saras.  After developing IT solutions for the 
group’s internal needs, which led to the creation of an advanced data centre (in 
Macchiareddu, Cagliari), these companies were able to offer competitive services 
to other affiliate (and outside) companies on the national market.   
The three IT companies Shelter, Scelta and Zonanet, which are part of a family 
of web projects and successful ventures spun off by the same partners, will also 
be consolidated into one single company in the near future. In this case, the 
merger is motivated mainly by a need to pool resources in the face of weak 
demand.  While Scelta is a veteran of the Sardinian  ICT sector (it was set up in 
1987), Zonanet was created in 1997 and has only just left the ICT incubator of 
the Polaris Internet Farm.  
Another positive trend is the development of formal links between companies 
and the local research community.  Several companies in our panel are actively 
engaged in joint research with various departments of the University of Cagliari 
and with other centres of research.   
Tiscali and the Saras group, for example,  are partners of the research centre 
CRS4, and therefore contribute to setting its lines of research as well as sharing 
its results.   
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Several companies established important links with the Polaris Technology Park.  
Atlantis, active in the field of local development and territorial management, 
employs a team of 20 researchers who work at Polaris56. Atlantis also cooperates 
with universities and research centres internationally: the Robotiker foundation, 
the University of Central London, the Italian national research centre CNR, and 
the University of Cagliari.   
The web communication company Axis is involved in two start-up companies 
at Polaris, in the field of genomics.  The company owns 15,38% of the 
consortium Parco Genos, which undertakes genetic research on the population of 
north-eastern Sardinia, and for whom Axis processes data into useable 
information, and 10% of Pharma-Gen, supplying them with services of intelligent 
representation. Through the venture Sardegna Innovazione, of which it owns 65%, 
Axis has an on-going joint project with the universities of Cagliari and 
Indianapolis. The project aims to create a technological platform for server-
client data transfers on UMTS cellular phones.   
The company Abbeynet, which patented a new audio streaming protocol (Voice 
over Internet) in 2000,  has very strong links with the local University 
Department of Electronic Engineering and Physics. The relations with the 
university are kept not only because some of Abbeynet’s founding members 
were academics, but also because the company’s emphasis on R&D motivates 
them to search for new staff primarily at the local university.  They signed a 
research agreement and develop innovative projects with the cooperation of the 
university.   
Energit, the multi-utility telecom and energy company who also patented their 
key energy product, awarded two scholarships to 2004 university graduates who 
presented original dissertations on the theme of renewable energy. 
 
Some companies, however, question the usefulness of forging ties with the 
university. Stelnet, the first database business in Sardinia, considers itself a spin-
off of the University of Cagliari’s engineering department, with whom it has 
excellent relationships, but has given up joint research with them.  While there 
are a lot of interesting projects and ideas - the company complains -  financing is 
always difficult and the long delays between approval and actual financing 
usually kill the projects.  By the time a new project can get underway  it is 
already obsolete.  This happened with projects undertaken with the University 
as well as the research centre CRS4, even with those earmarked as ‘innovative 
applied research’, for which three years passed by between planning and 
approval. The same problem applies to all public financing, so that often 
brilliant ideas, even at pre-competitive stage, are lost because of the ridiculously 
long time lags before the funds are actually available.  
                                                 
56 in addition to over 100 employed in sales and production 
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The local degree in IT was, however, widely criticised (in fact, no positive 
opinion was recorded) for being of little relevance to the needs of the 
companies.  The software houses, who train all their staff internally, prefer to 
use non-technical graduates, because in their experience they tend to be more 
motivated and turn into better IT professionals than the local IT graduates.   
Turning to the negative trends, the firms interviewed confirmed the general 
tendency of Sardinian companies to operate in isolation. The absence of formal 
or informal links between companies in this industry, to be fair, is not a 
peculiarity of the Cagliari Work System.  The high-tech cluster around Genoa, 
which employs around 9,000 people, is also characterised by a distinct lack of  
productive links.  However, the companies in the Genoa district – even in the 
absence of such links - realised the need to get together to pursue many 
common objectives. A number of them (130 out of some 200 operating in the 
area) teamed up and created the association Dixet to enhance the competences 
of the high-tech district57.  Among the stated common goals are: the growth of 
human resources, development of advanced ICT networks and systems, 
establishment of  joint laboratories between firms, university and research 
companies, and promotion of the district and its firms nationally and 
internationally.  As a result of this agreement, many local actors worked together 
to officially form the Genoa Technology District58, set up by Dixet,  the 
Regional Administration, the University of Genoa, the Genoese Chamber of 
Commerce and the Liguria Technology Park. 
Unfortunately, in the Cagliari area there are no signs of spontaneous 
cooperation among companies.   Not only the firms surveyed have no 
permanent or structured links with other ICT companies in the area, but also   
no “systematic preference” for the services of the Sardinian ISP has emerged 
from our findings.   
In its role as facilitator of technology transfer, Consorzio 21 carries out many 
activities aimed at local SMEs, often with the objective of strengthening 
cooperation among firms. Companies hosted in the Polaris Internet farm, for 
example, are invited to share their projects among them and tap on the expertise 
of researchers from the CRS4 centre. However, their success is mixed.  Some 
employees within Consorzio 21 point out that in order to win over well-known 
cultural barriers, companies were attracted to the Internet Farm with the 
promise of superior facilities and advanced telecommunication infrastructure.  
However delays and inefficiencies meant that this objective was only partially 
                                                 
57 From RUR, Censis Federcomin: Distretti Produttivi  Digitali. Rapporto 2003. www.censis.it  
58 In September 2004 the Italian Ministry for University Education and Research signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding which earmarks €30 million  for the creation of a public-private 
venture to manage all projects of the Genoa High Tech district.  The district specialisation is the 
development of Integrated Intelligent Systems for marine and port logistics. 
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achieved  - and with it went a great incentive to locate in the remote Technology 
Park. 
The issue of special competences and skilled labour was discussed with every 
company interviewed, with a view to establishing whether this perceived  
advantage of the Cagliari area in the early nineties was still significant. Given the 
extremely quick pace of technology in the computer and telecommunications 
industries,  these skills can rapidly become obsolete, and unsurprisingly opinion 
on this issue was rather divided.  
While Cagliari was a leader in internet technology in the past, today most of the 
companies who engage in research and development complain about lack of 
good technical skills. Abbeynet and Axis complained that they were unable to 
fill all their vacancies in 2003 because of the poor level of the applications they 
received.  The former only filled 10 out of 40 positions available.  Scelta and 
Prodinsar observed that high skilled labour at a relatively low price was available 
in the early days (the ‘90s) but now the price differential has evaporated and the 
level of competence seems to have decreased.   
Others point out that technical competences (which they find adequate to their 
needs) are not the main local bottleneck: according to Tiscali’s head of new 
business development, for example, there is no shortage of technical skills, but it 
is difficult to find (or even to import) good managers.  Energit laments the 
absence of sophisticated financial and commercial skills. In order to fill the local 
skill void, ad agency Soleja has invested massively in the creation of professional 
skills in the Cagliari area.  They trained their workforce not only in their specific 
discipline (camera, audio, video), but also in use of advanced ICTs and general 
communications and management techniques.  The agency built a network of 
professional competences, many of which are free lance and therefore are 
available on the market for everybody.   
At the same time, most entrepreneurs were ready to point to other benefits of 
the local workforce.  First of all, its stability: companies believe that they would 
face a much higher workforce turnover if they were based in more dynamic 
markets like Milan.  Secondly, its attachment to the territory: most workers 
accept to earn less than they could elsewhere in Italy, because they want to stay 
on the island.   It appears therefore that the local market is an excellent source 
of middle and low-end, rather than high technical skills.  There is a vast pool of 
labour looking for employment, and companies can therefore pick the very best.  
For the manufacturer Datarex, in fact,  the availability of good workers is the 
only advantage of operating in Sardinia.  The growth of call centres in the area, 
which tripled between 1991 and 200, seems to confirm the existence of such 
advantage.  
In different ways, most of the firms contacted had tales of difficulty with the 
local market.  Nearly half the companies contacted prefer to look out to other 
markets.  For the Scelta group, who derive 50% to 75% of sales from the 
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Sardinian market, the small size of Sardinian firms and the local business market 
is the main disadvantage of operating a software house in Sardinia. Furthermore, 
the private sector felt the effects of the 2003 economic slowdown, and only IT 
projects financed with public money actually went ahead.  The group, which had 
20 employees and around 5 consultants in 2003, was forced to make 
redundancies and switch those numbers around.  It now employs five people 
and uses around 20 consultants. Prodinsar complained that as national 
distribution took over the retail sector in Sardinia in the late 90s, many IT 
functions of the sector were centralised and brought outside the island, thus 
forcing the software house to target new sectors and develop new products.  
The company, however, also points to a positive side of operating in small 
markets: clients become extremely loyal and can positively assist and inspire the 
development of new product.  Soleja adds that it is impossible for a company to 
form and adopt a business plan if it is to rely on the Sardinian B2B market. 
Local demand is uncertain and can oscillate between significant ups and downs.  
Firms have to maximise the efficiency of their management lay out, so that they 
can remain small but also be able to implement rapid response time to new and 
bigger opportunities. The upside of such fickle markets is that companies are 
compelled to create flexible business structures with competitive costs.  Once 
such a flexible business is in place, however, it must be put to service a sizeable 
market outside the island: no company can realistically grow on the local market.  
Another serious deficiency of the local market is the inadequacy of its local 
telecommunications infrastructure. Saraslab/Akhela and Datarex, two 
companies located in the Macchiareddu industrial zone, complained that the 
topmost industrial area near Cagliari was never endowed with advanced 
telecommunications infrastructure, like a fibre ring to which companies could 
connect at their own expenses.  Saras proceeded to purchase their own fibre 
network, while Datarex had no option but to wait for the incumbent phone 
company to provide them with ASDL, only available in that area since late 
200359.  The same area hosts Cagliari’s own Telecommunication Pole, the new 
Tiscali headquarters, but so far no advanced telecommunications infrastructure 
has been offered to other resident companies in the industrial area.  
Finally, even though we heard from Scelta that public sector financing was 
crucial to keep the IT market moving in 2003, most of the interviewees 
expressed little satisfaction with public incentives, and the activities of the public 
sector in general.  The principle of public  incentives for start ups is not 
questioned: it is the modes and times of delivery that come under attack.  
Datarex was a direct victim of these inefficiencies and was extremely critical 
about the local financing and credit system.  The company was created by a 
                                                 
59 The MD recalls that, to add insult to injury, for several months Datarex was bombarded by calls 
from Telecom Italia’s sales agents who tried to sell ADSL even though it was not technically 
available. 
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small group of middle managers made redundant by Olivetti60 in the late 
eighties, who had money and competences to start up new businesses.  They set 
up shop in Cagliari because of the generous financial incentives and other forms 
of production support they were offered.  However, the reality check was brutal: 
the promised support took so long to materialise (years!) that the company 
nearly bankrupted, as it had to service high interest loans to cover expenses in 
the meanwhile.  A similar fate occurred to their only local supplier, a producer 
of plastic shells for diskettes, who became a victim of the expensive local credit 
system and closed within months.  
Conclusions 
1. Better infrastructure needed   
The island of Sardinia is one of the lesser developed areas of Italy.  Its 
infrastructural endowment is significantly inferior to that prevailing on the 
mainland.  Internal transport is particularly poor: Sardinia is the only region 
without a motorway and its rail infrastructure is the worst in the country.  Only 
when it comes to ports and airports, Sardinia is above national average.  
The island’s low levels of population density and per capita income make it a 
low priority for private investments in telecommunications infrastructure: 
broadband is mainly available through the incumbent’s network.  At the time of 
writing, the only alternative operator supplying broadband through local loop 
unbundling is the company Wind - and only in the Cagliari metropolitan area.   
Fibre operator Fastweb is not present on the island.  
E-government projects spearheaded by the Autonomous Region of Sardinia are 
expected to link all municipalities to a fast public network (the EGOS and 
RUPAR projects) within the next year.  Unfortunately, technology appears to 
move faster than public sector decision making! 
2. Education must improve but research is encouraging 
On the whole, the population of Sardinia has extremely low levels of education: 
nearly 40% of the resident population only completed primary school.  Even 
though the general level of education in Sardinia is below the national average, 
which in turn is lower than EU average, there are numerous active research 
centres, particularly around Cagliari.  The city hosts many research departments 
that belong to the local University, as well as CRS4, the research outfit of the 
regional Science and Technology Park Polaris, specialised in digital technology.  
In the nineties, CRS4 was instrumental in building advanced local competences 
in the (then) innovative fields of digital technology.  These were a crucial 
ingredient of the experimentations which led to the creation of Tiscali.  Today 
                                                 
60 Olivetti was a world class maker of typewriters based in Ivrea, northern Italy. In the 80s it 
undertook several major restructuring processes as it failed to make the transition to the PC market 
and eventually moved to telecommunications.  Since 2003 it controls Telecom Italia and adopted its 
name.  
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the work of CRS4 is no longer mentioned by local ICT companies as the main 
source of local innovation, probably the consequence – among other things - of 
a few years of difficulties in sourcing long-term funding for the centre.  The 
recent re-appointment of Nobel laureate Rubbia at the helm of CRS4 is 
expected to restore the centre’s authority to its original level.  A few local 
entrepreneurs, really niche innovators, have established valuable links with the 
department of Electronic Engineering at the local University, for original 
research as well as headhunting.   The same department is in charge of one of 
the largest e-government projects on the island.  
3. Cagliari: high unemployment, small firms, a growing ICT sector 
The local work system of Cagliari, capital city of Sardinia and focus of our 
analysis, is the largest on the island and one of the largest in Italy. It includes 32 
municipalities and accounts for 38% of the production units of the island.   
Unemployment is a severe problem in the area: the local rate of 20.37 is more 
than double the national average.  Cagliari shows a degree of relative 
specialisation in the fields of oil and chemicals, due to significant past 
investments in these sectors, and a mild specialisation in services, especially IT 
and financial.  The local ICT sector is also dominated by the service component.  
Computer related services employ locally nearly 2500 people, who work in many 
small outfits: average firm size in this area is only 3.27.  Conversely, 
telecommunications services are offered by much larger firms, each employing 
on average 49.19 workers.  Tiscali and the incumbent Telecom Italia are the 
largest telecommunications providers locally.   Call centres, which are not 
included in the OECD definition of ICT adopted here, are also a growing reality 
that employed just under 1000 people in 2001. Within the IT industry, software 
houses are the main type of business.  Here, a few large players share the market 
with a plethora of very small businesses.   
4. Local entrepreneurs wanted 
Local ICT companies appear to make little use of the network potential for 
broadening their client base, and prefer to do business using personal contacts 
and word of mouth.  With a few significant exceptions, businesses in Sardinia 
generally tend to be risk-averse rather than enterprising, and inward looking 
rather than international.  As a consequence, the service sector faces a very small 
and uncertain business demand, which reinforces the local trend towards small, 
generalist ICT businesses.  The few entrepreneurs who want to grow their niche 
markets operate successfully outside the island.  
5. Tiscali, Cagliari’s greatest corporate success story of all times  
In many ways, Tiscali represented the climax of a sequence of events and 
experiments that took place in the early nineties.  Through CRS4 and the short 
lived ISP video on line, Cagliari was accumulating innovative competences and 
novel business skills in the new field of Internet.  In 1998, Renato Soru, a 
former partner of VoL, set up Tiscali to compete with the national incumbent 
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Telecom Italia.  Initially geared for competition in long distance and 
international voice services, Tiscali operated an IP network from the start, as the 
emerging markets for Internet and data services presented good potential 
economies of scope.  By the end of 1999, Tiscali had made a mark in the 
fledgling  Italian internet market with its free internet offer and stunned the 
Nuovo Mercato with an extremely successful IPO.  At this point in time, Tiscali 
was positioning itself to become a key European player in the internet market.  
Voice telephony became a minor line of revenue, while the company planned to 
make its success with internet, e-commerce and portal revenues, and began 
acquiring any company that could make a significant contribution to this new 
business plan.  When Tiscali and World on Line agreed to merge, in September 
2000, the Sardinian company entered the European top five.  Tiscali’s 
management, until then totally Sardinian, began to internationalise too.  
6. A missed opportunity with UMTS 
In the same year Tiscali set up its venture into broadband mobile 
communications with the subsidiary Andala UMTS, also based in Cagliari, 
which bid for the Italian UMTS auction.  Tiscali had joined forces with 
Hutchison Whampoa, which put in the majority of the capital (over 80%).  
After the market crash and economic slowdown of 2001, however, UMTS 
appeared overpriced and its development prospects slow, so Tiscali abandoned 
the plan and reduced its participation to 0.3%.  The bid was successful and the 
newly licensed consortium, renamed H3G, moved to Milan leaving only a call 
centre in Sardinia.    
7. Tiscali bets on broadband – will it weather the storm?  
After a slow 2002, the company repositioned itself to bet on fixed broadband as 
the main revenue line.  ADSL numbers accelerated throughout Europe in 2003, 
and Tiscali has now 1.5 million broadband subscribers.   The new emphasis on 
broadband, however, raises important issues for the ISP.  Firstly, unless it is 
offered through the operators’ own network, ADSL has lower profit margins 
than dial up.  Secondly, in order to take advantage of ULL, operators must make 
investments on the local network.  These are critical issues for a company like 
Tiscali, which is heavily indebted and needs additional funds to finance its 
growth.  Thirdly, in the broadband environment Internet operators compete 
with other digital content distributors for sport and other rights: Tiscali is in a 
weak negotiating position compared to broadcasters and telecom incumbents in 
each market.  Analysts are on balance sceptical about Tiscali’s capability to raise 
enough cash to pay its debt and finance its growth, and rumours of possible 
takeovers abounded in 2004.   
In June of this year, Tiscali’s founder (and majority shareholder) put the 
business aside to pursue public office: he became the first elected governor of 
Sardinia.  
8. Promising examples of niche competences and new companies 
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Our interviews with leading players of the local ICT scene have described a local 
sector which, though unable to replicate the glittering success of Tiscali, shows a 
few encouraging examples of innovative and outward looking enterprises.   
Interestingly, while the majority of firms in our panel were set up by local 
entrepreneurs, the two largest outfits, which employ twice as many workers as 
the next largest firm in this set, are part of large national groups.  Akhela, the 
largest local software house, belongs to the oil group Saras, while Atlantis, 
which specialises in digital territorial management, was ceded by the same group 
to the Grozzini family (former IBM managers) in 2001.   Among the firms born 
and bred locally, Abbeynet and Energit appear the most dynamic realities.  The 
former has patented its own protocol for audio and video streaming on internet 
(VoI) and is harvesting increasing success both in Italy and abroad.  The latter is 
a multi-utility company that applies the synergies of web technology to all 
networked utilities and developed its own Virtual Network Plant.  Energit has 
grown in three years into a business with 56 employees and €26m in turnover.  
9. An advantage that should not be lost 
While Cagliari could boast the abundance of unique specialist skills in the early 
90s, today the advantage appears to have shifted to low end and middle range 
skills, which are plentiful and competitively priced.  There are several instances 
of very advanced niche skills, both technical and commercial, within Tiscali and 
the other companies we contacted.  However, these appear to be sporadic 
examples rather than the tell tale of an emerging paradigm.   
Attempts to consolidate the sector or pool together resources have produced 
mixed results.  On one hand, cultural barriers make it difficult to convince firms 
about the advantages of this type of behaviour.  On the other hand, there is 
evidence that good initiatives of the public sector got lost in the long corridors 
of bureaucracy and/or were carried out to a lower standard than expected.  
Most initiatives appear to have been initiated with a top-down approach.  The 
recent Telecom Pole project did not meet much enthusiasm among the firms we 
contacted.  Abbeynet is the only company to date that has moved some 
resources into its server farm, while most others questioned the value of the 
entire project.  Certainly knowledge building was not a political priority in the 
new millennium: in Cagliari, as in the rest of Italy, funding for research is getting 
harder to obtain. 
10.  And the future?  
Tiscali has undoubtedly benefited from some unique circumstances: advanced 
local competences built before the company, buoyant stock markets, and a 
lucrative sector newly open to competition.  None of these ingredients is now 
available for the new entrepreneurs on the Cagliari scene, or at least not to the 
same degree.  From this perspective, the existence of a few success stories, a 
mild degree of ICT specialisation in the Cagliari area, should be viewed as the 
symptom of a great potential that could unfold further.  Despite the lacking 
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infrastructure, the abysmal performance of the school system and the 
inefficiencies of the public sector, the distance from the central markets, there 
are examples of success.  Local resources are eager to be employed and learn. A 
lot more could be done, with better transport and telecommunications, strategic 
alliances and more education and research.   
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